The Reality of Hyperbaric Chamber Fires
Between 1923 and 1996, 77 people died in 35 hyperbaric chamber fires worldwide. Every fatal fire occurred in an enriched oxygen atmosphere above 28% O2. Since the adoption of modern safety protocols, the rate of serious incidents in accredited facilities has dropped to near zero. The risk is real but quantifiably small, and the data shows exactly what causes these events.
Historical Incident Data
The definitive academic analysis is Sheffield and Desautels (1997), published in Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine. Analyzing 73 years of records from 1923 to 1996, the study documented 77 deaths across 35 hyperbaric chamber fires.1 A broader UHMS Mishap Database covering all chamber incidents (not just fires) documents 135 deaths across 113 incidents over a 75-year period.3
“From 1923 to 1996, 77 people died in 35 hyperbaric chamber fires worldwide. Every fatal fire occurred in an enriched oxygen atmosphere above 28%.” — Sheffield and Desautels, Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 19971
Clinical chamber fire fatalities in North America from 1923-1996, per the Sheffield 73-year analysis1
Notable Incidents
| Year | Location | Outcome | Cause |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1997 | Milan, Italy | 11 deaths (10 patients + 1 nurse) | Multiplace chamber fire |
| 1998 | Istanbul, Turkey | 3 deaths | 1947-vintage chamber, no water deluge system |
| 2009 | Florida, USA | 2 deaths (grandmother + 4-year-old boy) | Non-certified chamber, off-label cerebral palsy treatment |
| January 2025 | Troy, Michigan | 1 death (5-year-old, Thomas Cooper) | Under investigation; criminal charges filed against facility |
| July 2025 | Lake Havasu City, Arizona | 1 death (43-year-old, Walter Foxcroft) | Fire in chamber at his own clinic |
The 2025 Michigan case led to criminal charges including second-degree murder against the facility’s CEO and safety manager.
Why Fires Are So Dangerous in Hyperbaric Environments
Understanding why fires are so dangerous in hyperbaric chambers requires basic fire science. Three elements must be present simultaneously:
- Fuel: Any organic material (clothing, bedding, hair, skin oils, cosmetics)
- Oxygen: Dramatically elevated in HBOT environments (21% ambient vs 100% in hard chambers)
- Ignition source: Static electricity, battery-operated devices, friction, metal-on-metal sparks
In a 100% oxygen environment at 2.0+ ATA, materials that resist combustion at normal pressure ignite easily, combustion is faster and more intense, and fire spreads rapidly in an enclosed space with no escape during pressurization. The Sheffield analysis found that all survivors of hyperbaric chamber fires were in chambers pressurized with air containing less than 23.5% oxygen.1
“Before 1980, chamber fires were primarily caused by electrical ignition. Since 1980, fires have been primarily caused by prohibited items that occupants brought inside.” — Sheffield and Desautels, 19971
Soft vs Hard Chamber Fire Risk
| Factor | Hard Chamber | Soft Chamber |
|---|---|---|
| Oxygen environment | 100% O2 at 2.0-3.0 ATA | ~24% O2 from concentrator at 1.3 ATA |
| Fire risk level | High (oxygen-enriched) | Lower (near-ambient O2) |
| Escape difficulty | Difficult (metal chamber, pressurized) | Easier (zipper, can be cut open) |
| Fire suppression | Required in accredited facilities (NFPA 99) | Typically absent |
NFPA 99 Fire Safety Requirements
Accredited HBOT facilities in the United States operate under NFPA 99 Chapter 14 (Healthcare Facilities Code, 2024 edition).2 Key requirements include:
- Fire suppression: Deluge fire suppression must activate within 3 seconds (NFPA 99 section 14.2.6.2.4)2
- Construction: 2-hour fire-rated construction; noncombustible or limited-combustible finishes
- Clothing: Only 100% cotton or specifically approved fabric blends (no nylon, polyester, rayon, wool, or Gore-Tex)
- Personnel: Every program must designate an on-site Hyperbaric Safety Director
- Electrical: Full isolation of chamber wiring; ability to de-energize circuitry in an emergency
- Oxygen monitoring: Continuous monitoring with automatic shutoff capability
Maximum activation time required for HBOT facility fire suppression systems under NFPA 99, Section 14.2.6.2.42
Prohibited Items (Complete List)
- All battery-operated devices (phones, watches, hearing aids, e-cigarettes)
- Lighters, matches, or any ignition source
- Petroleum-based products (Vaseline, lip balm, hair products, cosmetics)
- Synthetic clothing that generates static (nylon, polyester)
- Hand warmers or heat packs
- Lithium-ion batteries of any kind
In August 2025, the FDA Issued a Safety Warning
Following the 2025 incidents in Michigan and Arizona, the FDA issued a formal letter to health care providers in August 2025 warning about fire risks tied to HBOT devices, citing “recent reports of fires that resulted in serious injuries and deaths.”4 This represents the most recent federal regulatory response to hyperbaric chamber safety incidents.
Context: Fatality Rate in Perspective
With millions of HBOT sessions conducted annually in the US and fire incidents occurring rarely, the per-session fatality risk from fire at accredited clinical facilities is extraordinarily low. The UHMS Mishap Database records 135 deaths across 113 incidents over 75 years — a rate that, while tragic, reflects an extremely small fraction of millions of treatments delivered.3 The overwhelming majority of modern incidents involve home or unaccredited facilities where safety protocols are absent or poorly enforced.
See complete fatality data in our related post: how many people have died in a hyperbaric chamber.
- Sheffield PJ, Desautels DA. “Hyperbaric and hypobaric chamber fires: a 73-year analysis.” Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine. 1997;24(3):153-164. PMID: 9308138
- NFPA 99 Health Care Facilities Code, Chapter 14 (Hyperbaric Facilities). 2024 Edition. nfpa.org
- UHMS Chamber Experience and Mishap Database. uhms.org
- FDA. “Follow instructions for safe use of HBOT devices — letter to health care providers.” August 2025. fda.gov
- Wen Q. “Analysis of 38 accidents and the investigation of safety management about medical hyperbaric oxygen chamber in our country.” Chongqing Medicine. 2009.
- Zielinski E et al. “Fire in the Hyperbaric Chamber: Review of the Literature.” Polish Hyperbaric Research. 2023. doi:10.2478/phr-2023-0020
- Baromedical. “Hyperbaric chamber fires: Lessons lost.” baromedical.com. 2021 (updated 2025).
- ASME. “PVHO-1: Safety Standard for Pressure Vessels for Human Occupancy.”
Medical Disclaimer
The content on BaricBoost.com is for informational purposes only and is not intended as a substitute for professional medical advice, diagnosis, or treatment. Always seek the advice of your physician or other qualified health provider with any questions you may have regarding a medical condition. Never disregard professional medical advice or delay in seeking it because of something you have read on this website.
Author
Seph Fontane Pennock is the founder of BaricBoost.com and Regenerated.com, a clinic directory for regenerative medicine serving 10,000+ providers across the United States. He previously built and sold PositivePsychology.com, which grew to 19 million users and became the largest evidence-based positive psychology resource on the web. Seph brings direct experience as an HBOT patient, having completed protocols at clinics across three continents while navigating mold illness, systemic inflammation, and autoimmune conditions. His treatment journey includes hyperbaric oxygen therapy, peptide protocols, NAD+ therapy, and consultations with specialists from Dubai to Cape Town to Mexico. This combination of entrepreneurial track record and lived patient experience shapes everything published on BaricBoost.com. Every article is grounded in peer-reviewed research, informed by real clinical encounters, and written for patients making high-stakes treatment decisions. Seph's focus is on bringing transparency, scientific rigor, and practical guidance to the hyperbaric oxygen therapy space.
